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Alternative Calibration and Auction Institutions for Predicting Consumer  
Willingness-to-Pay for Non-Genetically Modified Corn Chips 
 
Abstract 
 This study explores two important issues in experimental economics: calibration and 
auction institution.  Consumer willingness-to-pay bids for corn chips made with non-genetically 
modified ingredients are elicited from a 1
st price and 2
nd price auction.  Results suggest that 
responses to scale differential questions, in a survey, accurately predict consumer willingness-to-
pay bids.  The 2
nd price auction induces a greater percentage of marginal bidders to offer a 
positive bid than a 1
st price auction.  However, average bid levels in the 1
st and 2
nd price auctions 
were not statistically different from one other.  In a small and unrepresentative sample, 70 
percent of student participants were unwilling to pay to exchange a bag of genetically modified 
corn chips for a bag of non-genetically modified corn chips.  However, 20 percent of respondents 
were willing to pay at least $0.25/oz for the exchange. 
   2 
Alternative Calibration and Auction Institutions for Predicting Consumer 
Willingness-to-Pay for Non-Genetically Modified Corn Chips 
 
Experimental economics are increasingly being used to estimate consumer demand for 
newly developed food products (Buzby et al.; Fox et al.; Fox; Hayes et al.; Lusk et al.; Melton et 
al.; Roosen et al.; Shogren et al., 2000).  Researchers are increasingly choosing experimental 
methods to gain perceived benefits relative to previously used contingent valuation methods.  
Because real products and real money are exchanged in an experimental setting, participants 
have a greater incentive to reveal their true value for a good than in a hypothetical survey setting 
(Fox et al.).  Although experimental methods are increasingly used in applied research with 
general acceptance, several aspects of experimental methods merit further discussion.   
The representativeness of experimental results is of non-trivial concern.  Because 
experiments are often conducted in a laboratory setting with relatively few participants, results 
may not reflect the views of the entire population.  In addition, only a particular type of 
consumer segment may be attracted to participate in a laboratory setting, resulting in potentially 
large sample selection bias.  For these reasons, recent work by Fox et al. and List and Shogren 
have attempted to combine the advantages of survey methods (large samples, relatively small 
sample selection bias, and cost effectiveness) and experimental methods (choice accountability) 
by calibrating hypothetical willingness-to-pay values from a survey and actual willingness-to-
pay values elicited in an experimental setting.  By observing the extent that participants over-bid 
in hypothetical surveys relative to experimental auctions, actual willingness-to-pay values can be 
estimated for a larger sample of participants who did not participate in an experimental auction.                    3 
 Of further interest to experimental economists is the auction mechanism used to elicit 
willingness-to-pay bids.  Previous experimental auction research in agricultural economics has 
utilized a variant of the Vickrey 2
nd price auction (Vickrey).  In a Vickrey 2
nd price auction, 
participants submit sealed bids for a product and the highest bidder wins the auction and pays the 
2
nd highest bid amount.  This auction mechanism is frequently used because of its theoretical 
demand revealing properties (see Shogren et al. 1994b or Vickrey for a formal discussion of 
these properties).  Although the 2
nd price auction has several theoretical advantages over other 
auction mechanisms, these benefits may disappear in practice. 
 One problem with the 2
nd price auction may be that participants do not necessarily 
realize, even when told, that their incentive is to bid their true maximum willingness-to-pay.  
Coppinger, Smith, and Titus (pg. 18) state, “Although the Second-Price auction provides an 
‘obvious’ incentive for full value bidding based on a simple dominance criterion, real people 
may not perceive this property except through learning, reflection, or perhaps even training or 
conditioning.”  In addition, it has been shown that bid prices in 2
nd price auctions may take 
considerable time to converge to their theoretically predicted value (Coppinger, Smith, and 
Titus) or do not converge to this “true” value at all (Kagel, Harstad, and Levin).
1  Thus, 
researchers interested in procedures where only one trial is conducted may find the 2
nd price 
auction to be ineffective at revealing true willingness-to-pay.  Other auctions, such as 1
st price 
auctions, where the highest bidder pays their own bid price, may provide a good approximation 
for true maximum willingness-to-pay values because inexperienced participants may better 
understand the experimental procedure.  Exploring alternative experimental auction methods is 
important when experiments are moved from laboratory environments to more familiar settings 
for the consumer, such as a grocery stores, where repeated trials are logistically more difficult   4 
(e.g., Lusk et al. 1999a).  Further, combining results from repeated-trial 1
st and 2
nd price auctions 
may yield more robust estimates of willingness-to-pay than 2
nd price auctions alone. 
 This paper explores alternative calibration and auction mechanisms in an experiment with 
application to a timely topic: consumer willingness-to-pay for non-genetically modified corn 
chips.  The paper proceeds as follows: a) issues surrounding production and consumption of 
genetically modified foods are introduced, b) literature regarding survey and experimental 
calibration is reviewed and an alternative calibration mechanism is discussed, c) theoretical and 
empirical properties of 1
st and 2
nd price auctions are reviewed, d) methods and procedures for the 
experimental design are outlined, e) results of the experiments are discussed, and f) implications 
and conclusions are presented.                 
 
Genetically Modified Foods 
Genetically modified (GM) foods are made with crops that have been supplemented by 
foreign genes (Feldmann, Morris, and Hoisington).  Although various degrees of plant and 
animal modification have occurred for years, new genetic engineering technologies are creating 
feed grains and oilseeds tolerant to pesticides, diseases, etc.  These characteristics have promoted  
increased crop yields and production flexibility and consequently have resulted in high levels of 
acceptance among agricultural producers.  When introduced in 1996, GM corn and soybeans 
comprised less than 2 and 8 percent, respectively, of total planted crop acres but accounted for 25 
and 52 percent, respectively, of planted acreage by 2000 (USDA/NASS).   
Despite the growth in production of GM grains and oilseeds, demand for foods produced 
from GM grains is uncertain (Miranowski et al.).  Although it is thought that most U.S. 
consumers generally accept foods with GM ingredients, resistance is growing among some   5 
consumer segments both domestically and internationally, particularly in the European Union.  
For example, in the fall of 1999, French activists and farmers protested a U.S. fast food chain not 
only because it sells food products made with GM ingredients, but also because it represents 
American’s general acceptance of GM foods (Kluger).  Foreign reluctance to accept GM foods 
threatens U.S. grain exports.  If the EU continues its ban on GM grains, the U.S. grain industry 
may be compelled to segregate GM and non-GM grain.  Further, some U.S. consumers are 
demanding labeling of products that are made with GM ingredients.  Such identity preservation 
would increase costs for U.S. producers, processors, and grain merchants.  In 1999, premiums 
from 8 to 15 cents/bu. for non-GM corn and 5 to 35 cents/bu. for non-GM soybeans were 
identified at the farm level in selected areas (Muirhead).   
Demand for information concerning consumer premiums for non-GM foods has grown as 
the safety and nutritional characteristics of GM foods are increasingly being debated.  Although 
scientific research indicates no safety differences between GM and non-GM foods, some 
consumers perceive dissimilarities, resulting in some food companies (e.g., Gerber and Heinz) 
purchasing only non-GM crops for their ingredients.  Due to the relative infancy of this growing 
market, little economic research has quantified consumer willingness-to-pay for non-GM food 
products.  This study offers an initial step in the valuation of non-GM foods by examining 
consumer willingness-to-pay for non-GM corn chips. 
 
Experimental Calibration 
 Comparing willingness-to-pay values from hypothetical surveys with experimentally 
elicited willingness-to-pay bids allows for the calculation of a calibration factor.  For example, 
Fox et al. (1998) found calibration factors in the range of 0.68 and 0.69 for consumer   6 
willingness-to-pay for irradiated pork.  This indicates that an individual, who indicated a 
willingness-to-pay value of $1.00 in a hypothetical survey, would actually pay about $0.68 in an 
experimental auction setting.  However, Fox et al. also found asymmetries in the calibration 
factors (a calibration factor of 0.55 to 0.59 was calculated for consumer willingness-to-pay for 
non-irradiated pork), indicating that calibration factors may be good specific.  List and Shogren 
found calibration factors in the range of 0.3 to 0.4 for baseball cards, further supporting the 
product specific nature of the calibration factors.
2 
 Previous calibration research has compared respondents’ willingness-to-pay values from 
experimental auctions with values obtained from an open ended hypothetical question.  One 
drawback to this approach is that the relationship between willingness-to-pay values elicited via 
survey and consumers’ “true” willingness-to-pay may be random and unpredictable.  In other 
words, some participants may indicate values near their true willingness-to-pay value while 
others may provide willingness-to-pay values quite different from their true valuation.  Of 
course, there may be more accurate ways of eliciting hypothetical willingness-to-pay values than 
an open-ended question format, such as the double bounded dichotomous choice framework 
(Hanneman, Loomis, and Kanninen) or a choice experiment (Adamowitz).  However, all these 
elicitation procedures require participants to respond to hypothetical situations regarding their 
true willingness-to-pay for a product.  Thus, respondents always have an incentive to under- or 
over-report their true valuation to gain some perceived economic surplus. 
 We propose using an indirect method of eliciting consumers’ attitudes that may reflect 
their true valuation for a good more accurately than hypothetical willingness-to-pay questions.  
Scale differential questions provide a method of indirectly obtaining consumer preferences that 
may be calibrated with willingness-to-pay values.
3  These questions typically require respondents   7 
to rank personal preferences or opinions over a pre-specified scale.  For example, Lusk, Fox, and 
McIlvain compared concerns for food safety issues by asking consumers to rank their degree of 
concern for bacterial contamination, spoilage, food irradiation, additives, etc. on a scale between 
one and five, where one was “not concerned at all” and five was “very concerned.”  As with 
other survey methods, responses to such scale differential questions may be acquired relatively 
inexpensively and may be subject to relatively less sample selection bias than experiments. 
 Calibration using scale differential questions may provide advantages over hypothetical 
willingness-to-pay questions.   First, consumers may find scale differential questions easier to 
answer than an open ended willingness-to-pay question.  Further, because economic valuations 
are not directly tied to scale questions, respondents have less incentive to misrepresent their true 
preferences for a good.  Therefore, responses to hypothetical scale differential questions may 
more closely approximate consumers’ true willingness-to-pay than hypothetical willingness-to-
pay questions.  As a result, we formulate the following maintain hypothesis: 












2 *      (1) 
where Pi is the i
th consumer’s response to a hypothetical willingness-to-pay question, Pi
* is the 
consumer’s true willingness-to-pay (elicited via experimentation), Si is the consumer’s response 
to a hypothetical scale differential question, and Si
* is the consumer’s true attitude, as 
represented on a scale.  If we fail to reject the hypothesis, then scale differential questions may 
predict actual willingness-to-pay values more accurately than hypothetical willingness-to-pay 
questions.  However, the hypothesis in equation 1 is not directly tested (there is no feasible way 
to estimate S
*), rather, we only estimate the ability of scale differential questions to predict actual 
willingness-to-pay values. 
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Auction Mechanism 
 Several methods are available to conduct experimental auctions.  As previously 
mentioned, Vickrey’s 2
nd price auction has received much attention in the agricultural economics 
literature.  Notable alternatives to this auction are the English, Dutch, and 1
st price sealed bid 
auctions.
4  Vickrey discusses, in some detail, the theoretical strategic equivalence between 
English and 2
nd price auctions and between the Dutch and 1
st price auctions.  Theoretically, the 
advantage of using an English or 2
nd price auction is that a participant’s dominant strategy is to 
bid their true maximum willingness-to-pay.  However, in a 1
st price or Dutch auction, 
participants are essentially involved in a game where they must choose a balance between 1) 
winning the auction and 2) gaining economic surplus when they submit a bid.  Vickrey shows 
that if bidders are homogenous, risk neutral, and draw their values from a known rectangular 
distribution, then the Nash equilibrium bid, bi, offered in a Dutch or 1
st price auction is: 
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      (2) 
where N is the number of bidders and vi is the bidder’s true value for the good.  Obviously, as 
the number of bidders increases, the bid value approaches the true value. 
 Several studies have attempted to compare respondent behavior in alternative auction 
settings to test Vickrey’s equivalency hypotheses, but conflicting results have been found.  Using 
induced values, Coppinger. Smith, and Titus found that bids in English and 2
nd price auctions 
were similar, however, Dutch and 1
st price bids diverged.  They also found that 1
st price bids 
tended to be greater than Dutch, 2
nd price, and English bids.  Cox, Smith, and Walker also found 
1
st price bids to be greater than the predicted Nash equilibrium bidding behavior suggested by 
Vickrey.  They attributed much of the divergence from theory to risk averse bidding behavior 
and generalized Vickrey’s results to allow for risk aversion.  In contrast, Harrison attributed the   9 
divergence of empirical 1
st price bids from theoretical values to heavily debated “pay-off 
dominance” problems.  He argued that the participant’s pay-off function is flat in the area of the 
optimal bid and they consequently have poor incentives to bid optimally.  In contrast, Lucking-
Reiley found, in Internet auctions, that revenues generated via Dutch auctions were significantly 
higher than 1
st price auctions.   
Vickrey 2
nd price auctions also appear to violate theoretical predictions.  Although the 2
nd 
price and English auctions have been found to be isomorphic in some studies, Kagel, Harstad, 
and Levin and Kagel and Levin found a tendency for both experienced and inexperienced 
participants to “over bid” in 2
nd price auctions.  They determined that a 2
nd price auction yielded 
higher bids than a 1
st price auction.  While Coppinger, Smith, and Titus, and Cox, Smith, and 
Walker observed 2
nd price values below predicted theoretical values, Kagel, Harstad, and Levin 
and Kagel and Levin found 2
nd price values above predicted theoretical values.  In all four 
studies, 2
nd price auctions either required several repeated trials to converge to the predicted 
theoretical value, or never converged at all.            
 No doubt much of the debate regarding the divergence of 1
st and 2
nd price auctions from 
theoretically predicted values depends upon the assumed behavior of auction participants, as well 
as the particular experimental design.  In the case of independent private values and risk 
neutrality, revenues from 1
st and 2
nd price auctions should be theoretically equivalent.  In 
practice, there are a wide variety of results from various auction mechanisms.  When selecting an 
appropriate auction mechanism to elicit participants’ true willingness-to-pay, all auction 
mechanisms involve the exchange of real money and real products and thus more accurately 
reveal a consumer’s true preferences than a hypothetical survey.  Although the 2
nd price auction 
theoretically elicits participants’ maximum willingness-to-pay, 1
st price auctions may aid in   10
predicting future premiums in the marketplace.  Because research indicates that participants may 
overbid in a 2
nd price auction and that bid values are less than true values in a 1
st price auction 
(although somewhat higher than the predicted Nash equilibrium), perhaps results from 1
st and 2
nd 
price auctions may generate lower and upper bounds for true willingness-to-pay values.  First-
price auctions still reflect a premium that consumers’ paid in an experiment and thus may reflect 
a lower or upper bound, depending upon participant’s risk preference and perception of other 
participant values, on what they will pay for the good in the marketplace.  Therefore, we 
compared two sealed bid auctions, a 1
st and 2
nd price auction, to value non-GM corn chips.  This 
study: a) contributes to the sparse literature comparing 1
st and 2
nd price auctions where private 
values are not known (i.e. participants are not assigned induced values), b) calculates lower and 
upper bounds for consumer willingness-to-pay for non-GM corn chips, and c) compares bids 
from the two auction formats across trials to determine which auction may perform best with 
inexperienced bidders when repetitious trials are infeasible.   
 
Methods and Procedures 
 Consumer valuation for non-GM corn chips was measured using two sealed bid auctions, 
a 1
st and 2
nd price auction.  Students enrolled in two sections of a junior/senior level agricultural 
economics class at a large midwestern university comprised the participants for both treatments.  
Initially, participants were requested to complete a short survey in which they provided 
demographic information and answer several scale differential questions regarding their 
preference and concern for GM foods.  Following completion of the survey, a candy bar auction 
was conducted to familiarize participants with the experimental procedure.     11
In both the 1
st and 2
nd price auctions, participants were endowed with one dollar and a 
one-ounce bag of corn chips identified as manufactured with GM corn.  Participants were 
informed that consumption of the bag of chips was mandatory upon completion of the auction.  
In each auction, five trials were conducted and participants were asked to indicate their 
maximum willingness-to-pay to exchange their bag of GM corn chips for a bag of corn chips not 
made with GM corn.  Following each trial, the winning bidder number and market price were 
announced.  At the end of the session, one of the five trials was randomly selected as the binding 
trial and the highest bidder in that trial paid the appropriate bid amount to receive the bag of corn 
chips identified as free of GM corn.  In the 2
nd price auction, the highest bidder paid the second 
highest bid price.  However, the highest bidder in the 1
st price auction paid the highest bid (i.e. 
his or her own bid price). 
 A number of methods may be used to econometrically examine the impacts of scale 
differential questions and auction mechanisms on willingness-to-pay bids from an experiment.  
Some participants may bid nothing to exchange a GM food for a non-GM food, resulting in zero 
willingness-to-pay.  In this case, bids are represented by a positive distribution truncated at zero.  
The double hurdle model was used to estimate willingness-to-pay because it allows for different 
determinants of zero bids and positive bids (Cragg).  The first hurdle, represented by a probit 
model, is the respondents’ decision to pay a positive amount for the exchange.  If Pi is the i
th 
consumer’s bid for the exchange, the probability of the respondent choosing not to bid a positive 
amount, (Pi = 0), is given by: 
    Prob ) ( ) 0 (
'
1 i i x P b - F = =      (3) 
where F is the standard normal distribution function, xi is a vector of consumer i’s economic and 
demographic characteristics, and b1 is a vector of coefficients.  The second hurdle determines the   12
effect of independent variables on Pi given that Pi > 0.  The distribution of Pi conditional on 
being positive is truncated at zero with mean b2
’xi and variance s
2.  The second hurdle is 
formulated as: 
( )
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where f is the standard normal density function and b2 is a vector of coefficients.  This 
specification of the double hurdle model assumes that error terms in equations 3 and 4 are 
independent and normally distributed.     
To examine the relationship between scale differential questions and willingness-to-pay 
bids, several variables were incorporated into xi in equations 3 and 4.  Parameter estimates 
corresponding to particular scale differential questions are useful for assessing the ability of the 
scale to predict actual purchases.  Further, dummy variables were included to estimate the impact 
of the alternative auction mechanisms on the probability a participant would have a positive bid, 
as well as the bid level, given a positive bid. 
 
Results 
 There were thirty-two participants in the 2
nd price auction and 18 participants in the 1
st 
price auction.
5  Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for both treatments.  Participant 
characteristics were fairly homogeneous across both treatments although there were a greater 
percentage of female participants in the 1
st price auction.   
Scale Differential Questions 
Survey responses for several scale differential questions are also reported in table 1.  The 
first scale differential question polled respondents regarding their feelings for GM foods on a   13
scale between one and ten, where one was “good” and ten was “bad.”  The mean response for 
both treatments was near eight, indicating little objection to GM foods.  In the second scale 
differential question, participants indicated their willingness to purchase GM foods.  The scale 
ranged between one (not at all willing) and ten (very willing to purchase GM foods).  Both 
groups expressed a strong willingness to purchase GM foods.   
The remainder of the scale differential questions focused on individuals’ concern for food 
safety issues such as use of genetic engineering/biotechnology, fat, cholesterol, bacteria, and use 
of growth hormones in livestock.  Participants characterized their concern on a scale of one to 
ten where one was “not at all concerned” and ten was “very concerned.”  1
st price auction 
participants tended to indicate slightly more concern for food safety issues than participants in 
the 2
nd price auction, however the differences are not statistically different.  Participants in both 
treatments indicated that genetic engineering/biotechnology was of only slight concern among 
the food safety issues.  The seemingly high level of acceptance of GM products, as indicated in 
the scale questions, reflects the selected survey sample.  All students were from midwestern 
towns, enrolled in an agricultural major, and many students were from a farm background.  
Given the nature of the sample, it is likely that the participants would be more accepting of GM 
foods than the general population. 
The value of scale questions rests with its ability to predict consumer willingness-to-pay 
values.  Multiple criteria were considered to evaluate which scale questions to include in the 
econometric model.  Ideally, all three GM related scale questions could be used to predict 
willingness-to-pay bids.  However, because the scale questions were highly correlated, only one 
was included in the model.  Initially, the correlation between each of the scale questions (GM 
feel, GM willing, and GM concern) and WTP and PAY was calculated.  GM concern was most   14
highly correlated with both WTP and PAY.  The models specified in equations 3 and 4 were 
estimated with WTP and PAY as dependent variables and included each of the three scale 
questions as independent variables.  T-tests and F-tests for joint significance revealed that, 
among the three GM scale questions, the GM concern variable was the most economically and 
statistically significant determinant for WTP and PAY.  The remaining discussion is limited to 
results pertaining to the GM concern variable; however, similar results were found for the GM 
feel and GM willing variables.
6 
Results from the estimation of equations 3 and 4 are presented in table 2.  The dependent 
variables, WTP and PAY, were constructed by averaging bids from trials 4 and 5.  The scale 
variable, GM concern, was highly significant in explaining both the probability a participant 
would pay a positive amount and the amount they would pay for non-GM corn chips.  A one-unit 
increase in the level of concern for GM food is associated with an 8.6 percent increase in the 
probability that an individual offers a positive bid, ceteris paribus.  Thus, an individual who 
indicated a high level of concern for GM food (scale value =  8) would be over 50% more likely 
to pay to avoid GM corn chips as an individual with little concern for GM foods (scale value = 
2).  Given that an individual offered a positive bid, a one-unit increase in the level of concern for 
GM foods was associated with a $0.058 increase in the bid level.  The sign and statistical 
significance of the GM concern variable indicates that that survey responses can be used to 
predict actual willingness-to-pay values (i.e. survey results can be calibrated to experimental 
results).  For example, if a respondent indicated a GM concern level of 8, our calibration results 
suggest that there is over a 70 percent chance they would submit a positive bid.  This same 
individual, assuming that a positive bid was given, would bid $0.34.
6   15
Auction Format 
 Figure 1 illustrates participants’ willingness-to-pay for non-GM corn chips by treatment 
group.  In the 2
nd price auction, more participants were willing to pay a positive amount relative 
to the 1
st price auction.  Only three participants in the 1
st price auction indicated a positive 
willingness-to-pay in the 4
th and 5
th trials.  However, 2
nd price auction participants demonstrated 
willingness-to-pay at several increasing price premiums.  The 2
nd price auction appears to 
motivate a larger percentage of marginal bidders to bid some small amount as compared to the 1
st 
price auction. 
Figure 2 presents the average bid levels for both auctions across each of the 5 trials.  
Average bid levels differed between by over $0.03/oz. in trials 1 and 2 but appeared to converge 
in trials 4 and 5.  However, the difference between bid levels in the two auction formats is not 
statistically different at any of the five trials.  Average bids were fairly consistent across all trials 
for the 1
st price auction but were relatively variable over the trials for the 2
nd price auction.  This 
suggests that a “learning curve” was associated with the 2
nd price auction while participants in 
the 1
st price auction did not require repeated trials to understand the process.  Thus, “one-shot” 
auctions may produce more valid results when a 1
st price auction format is used.  In fact, the 
average bids in trials 1 and 5 were identical in the 1
st price auction.     
Results of the double hurdle model lend additional insight into the impact of auction 
mechanism on participant bids (table 2).  The auction format was significant in determining the 
probability of paying for non-GM corn chips.  Participants in the 2
nd price auction were 50 
percent more likely to pay for the exchange than participants of the 1
st price auction.  This may 
imply that the 2
nd price auction is more proficient than the 1
st price auction in motivating 
marginal bidders (those that may not win the auction) to bid their true willingness-to-pay values.    16
The auction format, however, did not significantly impact the average level of the bids.  
Estimates of the 2
nd hurdle indicate that the 1
st price auction may have produced lower bids 
relative to the 2
nd price auction, but this difference was not statistically significant.  Thus, from a 
statistical standpoint, there is no advantage in using the demand revealing Vickrey 2
nd price 
auction as opposed to the 1
st price auction, if the average bid is the only statistic of concern.  In 
this particular application, both auctions produced equivalent average bids although the 
distributions of bids were not identical.   
Willingness-to-Pay for Non-Genetically Modified Corn Chips 
 Figure 3 illustrates willingness-to-pay bids for non-GM corn chips among all participants 
in both treatments, measured as the average of trials 4 and 5.  Seventy percent of participants 
were not willing-to-pay for non-GM corn chips.  The average bid to exchange a bag of GM corn 
chips for non-GM corn chips was $0.07/oz.  Although the majority of participants did not wish to 
pay for non-GM corn chips, a number of individuals indicated a relatively large willingness-to-
pay to exchange the corn chips made with GM corn.  Twenty percent of participants were 
willing-to-pay at least $0.25/oz. for the exchange and two percent of participants offered bids as 
high as $0.50/oz.  This indicates a potentially viable niche market for non-GM chips.  Based on 
these results, a standard bag of corn chips made with non-GM corn could capture a sizeable 
premium among particular consumer groups.   
 Results from the double hurdle model indicate that participant demographics have an 
impact on willingness-to-pay values.  Gender and hometown population, as well as the health 
variables (Fat Concern and Exercise), had little influence on the probability that an individual 
would pay to avoid chips made from GM corn.  However, the frequency of chip consumption 
significantly affected the probability of paying for non-GM chips.  Results indicate that for a   17
one-unit increase in chip consumption, consumers are 20 percent less likely to pay for chips 
made with non-GM corn.  Results of the truncated regression (i.e. the second hurdle) suggest that 
chip consumption and exercise are significant determinants of the amount consumers are willing 
to pay to avoid chips made with GM corn. The most significant determinant of willingness-to-
pay values was participants’ level of exercise.  Although exercise does not affect a consumer’s 
decision to pay for non-GM chips, it is significant in determining the amount consumers will pay 
for non-GM chips.  An increase in the amount of exercise increases bids for non-GM chips by 
$0.34/oz.  Consumers with higher levels of chip consumption are significantly less likely to pay 
for non-GM corn chips.  This may imply that individuals who frequently consume chips made 
from GM corn are less averse to the perceived risks associated with GM foods.  
 
Conclusions and Implications 
 This study addressed two relevant issues concerning experiments conducted in 
agricultural economic research: improving the representativeness of experimental results and the 
practical validity of auction mechanisms.  We use a small and unrepresentative sample of 
students to estimate the demand for non-genetically modified (GM) foods.  We found that scale 
differential questions, where participants ranked their level of concern for GM foods on a scale 
of 1 to 10, provided accurate predictions of participant willingness-to-pay bids.  Scale questions 
were statistically significant in explaining both the probability that an individual will offer a bid 
as well as the bid level to exchange a bag of chips made with GM corn for a bag of chips made 
without GM corn.  Thus, hypothetical surveys with scale differential questions administered to a 
large sample may potentially be used to estimate consumer willingness-to-pay using calibration 
factors found in laboratory settings.  Future research should be directed at comparing the relative   18
ability of scale questions, hypothetical open-ended questions, and other contingent valuation 
methods to predict willingness-to-pay values in experimental auctions.       
 Choice of auction format may have important implications for experimental studies.  Due 
to its theoretical demand revealing properties, the Vickrey 2
nd price auction has been the auction 
mechanism of choice for agricultural economists. However, other auction formats may perform 
relatively well in practice.  Previous research has indicated that 2
nd price auctions may produce 
results inconsistent with theoretical predictions.  In this study, a 1
st price auction was conducted 
and results were compared across auction format.  We found that a larger percentage of 
participants offered positive bids in the 2
nd price auction, indicating that marginal bidders, who 
have little chance of winning, may be more inclined to state their true willingness-to-pay in a 2
nd 
price auction as opposed to a 1
st price auction.  However, bid levels across auction formats were 
not statistically different.  Thus, from a practical standpoint, the 1
st and 2
nd price auctions 
produced virtually identical average bids after several trials.  Participants seemed to have better a 
priori understanding of the 1
st price auction mechanism, as bid levels remained relatively 
constant across all 5 trials.  However, 2
nd price auction bids varied and appeared to converge to 
1
st price bid levels after 3 trials.  Since our sample is small and results may be product specific, 
we cannot conclude, with a large degree of confidence that 1
st and 2
nd price auctions will always 
produce identical average bid levels.  In the future, the relative comparisons between the 1
st and 
2
nd price auctions should be compared in a larger number of experiments to evaluate the 
robustness of the results presented here.  Useful extensions of this research should focus on 
comparing the relative performance of the English and Dutch auctions, in addition to the 1
st and 
2
nd price auctions.  The English and 2
nd price auctions should theoretically produce identical 
results because the dominant strategy in both auctions is to bid full value regardless of risk   19
orientation.  It is curious that the English auction, which is potentially more understandable than 
the 2
nd price auction, is demand revealing, and has performed extremely well in previous studies, 
has not been used in applied experimental studies to value non-market food items.          
The continuing development and controversy surrounding GM foods necessitates the 
need for information regarding consumer willingness-to-pay for segregation between GM and 
non-GM food products.  In a small and unrepresentative sample, we found that the majority of 
experiment participants were unwilling to pay a premium for non-GM corn chips.  However, 
twenty percent of consumers bid $0.25/oz. or more in order to exchange their GM chips for non-
GM chips.  Although our sample was limited, inferences about the general population can be 
made.  It is reasonable to believe that relative to the general public, participants in our sample 
may have more favorable opinions towards GM foods given their educational background and 
geographic location.  If experiments were conducted with a larger and potentially more 
representative sample, we would expect a larger percentage of participants to bid and bid at 
higher levels.  The extent to which our results represent a lower bound on consumer willingness-
to-pay for non-GM chips is uncertain.  A safe assumption however is that a viable, albeit 
somewhat small, niche market may be willing-to-pay a large premium for non-GM corn chips.     20
Footnotes 
1Shogren et al. (1994b) used a Vickrey n
th price auction to encourage marginal bidders to bid 
their true value.  In addition Shogren et al. (2000), have shown that the willingness-to-
pay/willingness-to-accept disparity converges more quickly with a random n
th price auction than 
in a 2
nd price auction.  However, in their settings, not only are the true willingness-to-pay values 
of the items unknown, but it is also unknown how long it takes the values to converge to their 
true value, if at all.  
2Blackburn, Harrison, and Rutstrom and Harrison et al. have also studied calibration of 
hypothetical and real valuations.  Their studies are somewhat more complex in that they estimate 
bias functions to correct for cross commodity comparisons and free-rider problems.   
3The term calibration, as it is used here, simply implies that scale differential questions may 
serve as a predictor of actual willingness-to-pay values. 
4In an English auction, participants offer ascending bids until only one participant, the one with 
the highest bid, is left in the auction.  This participant then pays the high bid.  In a Dutch auction, 
a “clock” begins by reporting bids at an arbitrarily high value.  Over time, the and bids descend 
incrementally.  The first participant to “signal” an acceptance of a bid, wins the auction and pays 
the bid amount.      
5Results of the Vickrey auction should be invariant to sample size because the dominant strategy 
should be to bid full value regardless of other participant values.  Fox et al. found that 2
nd price 
auction bids were invariant to sample size.  In our experimental design, the sample size may 
influence results in the 1
st price auction.  A larger number of participants in the 1
st auction (i.e. 
30 or 40) would likely produce bids that more closely resemble true values than an auction with 
a small number (i.e. 15 or 20) of individuals (see equation 2).  We chose to conduct the 1
st price   21
auction with the smaller sized class to determine whether strategic bidding behavior in the 1
st 
price auction produced results different from the 2
nd price auction where the true willingness-to-
pay should theoretically be revealed.  Although our total sample is small, other research has 
produced useful results from a group of 50 to 100 students (Busby et al.; Fox).   
6Estimates using GM willing and GM feel are available from the authors. 
7Estimates are calculated using the mean values of the independent variables.  22
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Table 1.  Survey Summary Statistics 







































































0.068   
(0.164) 




Note: there were 32 participants in the 2
nd price auction and 18 participants in the 1
st price auction 
aMean value of variable 
bNumbers in parentheses are standard deviations 
cSurvey question asked, “How do you feel about genetically modified foods?” 
dSurvey question asked, “How willing are you to purchase genetically modified foods?” 
eSurvey question stated, “Indicate your level of concern for the following food safety issues.” 
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Table 2.  Double Hurdle Model – Determinants of Consumer Willingness to Pay for  
 Non-Genetically Modified Corn Chips 
    1
st Hurdle
    2
nd Hurdle
 
Variable   
Probability 
of Paying
a   
Amount                    
Paid 
































































Dependent variables were calculated by averaging trial 4 and 5 bids  
Number of observations = 50 
Log likelihood of 1
st hurdle = -20.7; Log likelihood of 2
nd hurdle = -20.08  
Percentage of correct predictions in 1
st hurdle = 76%  
aEstimates are marginal effects 
bOne and two asterisks indicate statistical significance at the 0.10 and 0.05 levels, respectively. 
cNumbers in parenthesis are standard errors 
dEat Chip= number of times corn chips consumed per weeek. 
e1
st price auction = 1 if participant was in 1
st price auction, 0 if in 2
nd price auction 
fSigma is the disturbance standard deviation    27
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